With the acrid smoke of the electoral battles in the homeland, it is difficult to discern what might emerge the day after.
The consensus outside Greece among policy makers and analysts is that a SYRIZA victory would lead to a deadlock in relations between Greece and its funders.
Is that the reality, or are they trying to intimidate potential SYRIZA voters?
Why must we exclude the possibility that SYRIZA understands the parameters within which they must operate to avoid being unable to pay the interest on its loans a few months from now, consequently resulting in bankruptcy and a return to the drachma?
Is such a dangerous road implausible? Of course not. But it is not only in SYRIZA’s hands. There is another side: the Eurozone, and its bureaucracy, who are not thrilled about the prospect of the success of a SYRIZA government.
SYRIZA is akin to other European populist parties that the Eurozone finds threatening. And although the Eurozone can survive without Greece, it will be difficult for it to endure without Spain, where the Podemos Party is now in the lead.
Accordingly, they would like to make SYRIZA the example of what must be avoided, so they can say the same about similar parties.
They hope a SYRIZA failure would avert the risk of populist and far-left parties, among others, springing up out of nowhere in Germany, which would turn Europe upside down.
But would SYRIZA’s flop be enough?
No, because how many more years can the people tolerate this situation before saying “No!” to the euro, and even to democracy?
That is a question that the Eurozone leaders should thoughtfully contemplate.